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Abstract
The 1993 reform of rail transport in Great Britain led to an outright break-up of the
British Rail vertically integrated monopoly. All railway activities have been isolated
and divided among private operators whose relationships are determined by contracts.
This paper examines the relevance of a vertical separation between train operations
and rolling stock ownership and the stability of this new structure. Transaction cost
theory, which mainly concentrates on vertical integration and contractual coordination
issues, provides a relevant analytical framework.
It is argued that the disintegrated governance structure is not suitable to the features of
the relationships between lessors and lessees of rolling stock. Moreover, the
coordinative mechanisms of existing leases cannot solve the problems caused by
vertical separation. Therefore, operators have adapted the structure and change the
characteristics of the rolling stock market transactions.
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I. Introduction
The EC Directive 91/440/EEC only imposed to separate the accounting systems
of railways infrastucture and operations. But, Great Britain has embarked on a much
more radical restructuring programme as it split all railway activities at the time of
British Rail (BR) reform. Thus, the 1993 Railways Act involved a vertical and
horizontal disintegration of the industry. The result is a complex structure where
decisions are not centralised as in the former monolithic BR, but divided among
several tens of private operators linked by contracts.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the revised British railway industry and
the consequences of the change from a vertically integrated monopoly to a “ hybrid ”
governance structure. Transaction Costs Economics (Coase, Williamson), which
mainly focus on vertical integration and contractual coordination issues, is used to
assess the efficiency of this reform.
The structure of this paper is as follows.
In section II the reformed structure of the rail system will be briefly described
and the characteristics of the rolling stock leasing market transactions will be
considered. The analysis will show that the vertical disintegration of rolling stock
ownership and train operations is not relevant since relationship-specific investments
are involved.
Section III examines the coordinative mechanisms of leasing contracts and
reveals that they are not incitative enough to efficiently govern transactions with a
high level of assets specificity.
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Section IV addresses the several ways operators change the governance
structure and modify assets specificity.
II. A transaction cost analysis
 
of the rolling stock leasing market 
1. The reformed structure of passenger transportation activity
In 1994 Great Britain became the first country to privatise railway operations
resulting in fully separate activities.
John Major’s Government wanted to splinter British Rail monopoly into
potentially competitive elements. However the reform ultimately led beyond
structural separation since a horizontal dimension was introduced, bringing about 100
firms.
1.1 Infrastructure
Rail infrastructure is separated from rail operation and is now under Railtrack’s
responsability. This company, whose key purpose is to own, maintain and develop
Britain’s mainline rail infrastructure (tracks, depots, stations and signalling), was
successfully floated on the Stock Exchange in 1996.
Railtrack grants train operators access rights to the tracks for access charges and
leases stations and depots to them.
1.2 Train operation
The passenger services have been reorganised on a geographical basis into 25
units : the Train Operating Companies (TOCs)
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These TOCs have been sold as franchises of 7 to 15 years to private companies
through the newly created Franchising Authority.
The franchisees earn revenue from fares and Government subsidies and pay
infrastructure access charges to Railtrack and rolling stock leasing charges to the
ROSCOs (Rolling Stock Operating Companies).
Indeed, the rolling stock assets of BR was passed to three private leasing
companies, the Rolling Stock Operating Companies1, who in turn lease it to franchise
operators.
Theoretically, the ROSCOs provide finance for the procurement of new rolling
stock and are responsible for the heavy maintenance of their fleet, but they generally
procure these services from contractors.
While licences issued by the Regulator are required for Railtrack and the TOCs
under the provisions of the Railways Act 1993, the ROSCOs are not regulated.
Therefore, their activities and leases themselves are subject only to general
competition law.
1.3 Regulation
Two key organisations regulate the industry.
The Office of Rail Regulator (ORR) regulates infrastructure access. It issues,
modifies and enforces licences to operate trains, network, stations and depots. It
oversees the agreements for track access as well as the charges of access. Lastly, it
enforces competition law, prevents abuse of dominant position and protect consumer
interests.
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The Strategic Railways Authority (SRA) is responsible for administering and
supervising the franchising of passenger rail services. It also controls the respect by
the franchisees of the Passenger Service Requirement (PSR). The SRA also pays
subsidies to the TOCs in order to preserve public utilities, insure profitability for
shareholders and the payment of access charges to Railtrack.
The new passenger rail industry2
2. Transaction cost analysis of the new governance structure
Transaction cost theory (TCT) concentrates a lot on vertical integration issues.
According to this theory, the reasons for integration are numerous but assets
specificity3 is held to be the most explicative element (Williamson [1985]). Thus,
                                                                                                                                           
1
 Since 1999, there are 4 ROSCOs since a new one appeared on the occasion of new rolling stock
orders made by Virgin.
2
 The broken line in the diagram denotes the general ambit of regulation by the ORR and the SRA.
3
 Relationship-specific assets are “ durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular
transactions ” (Williamson [1985]), and that “ have a higher value in their intended than in their next
best use. ” (Crocker-Masten [1991])
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when an exchange between a buyer and a seller involves significant investments in
relationship-specific assets, trading partners are locked into a bilateral dependency
relationship. To avoid risks of expropriation of the rents accruing to the specific
assets, the client can integrate his supplier’s activity or draw up a long term
agreement.
On the contrary, if a firm notices a loss of specificity of one of its activity, it
would rather turn to the incitative structure of the market and chose to disintegrate this
activity (Anderson [1988]). Therefore, TCT views disintegration in a dynamic way as
the result of a loss of assets specificity .
As regard British railways reorganisation, and more particularly rolling stock
related activities, disintegration is the result of the political wish to introduce
competitive elements in the industry. It is not the result of a loss of rolling stock assets
specificity. In fact, disintegration has not emerged as the obvious consequence of a
change in rail assets specificity ; it has been chosen to introduce market forces without
taking assets specificity into account, as we will see.
Our working hypothesis will therefore be the following :
The disintegrated governance structure of rolling stock related activities is
not aligned with transaction attributes of these assets. Therefore operators have
two options : to modify the governance structure or to change rolling stock assets
specificity.
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2.1 The rolling stock market transactions
2.1.1 The relationships between lessors and lessees of rolling stock
a) Physical-assets specificity4
The issue raised by the separation of train operation and rolling stock ownership
is linked to assets specificity. Indeed, the rolling stock is not standard in Great Britain.
On the one hand, “ some vehicles are designed for specific purposes and are not fully
interchangeable [commuter trains cannot run on intercity routes] ” (Review of the
Rolling Stock Market. Report to the Deputy Prime Minister, 1998). On the other hand,
infrastructure imposes additional constraints since there are two types of power
supply : by third rail and by catenary. Thus, there are restrictions on the parts of the
network on which different types of rolling stock may operate. For instance, electric
trains cannot operate on non electrified routes and electric trains with pantograph
(power supply by catenary) cannot run on track supplied by third rail.
Therefore, TOCs are dependent upon the ROSCO owning vehicles specific to
the routes they operate and cannot find several suppliers for the type of trains they
need. In the same way, for their specific trains, ROSCOs do not have many clients
and thus are dependent upon the TOC(s) leasing specific rolling stock.
Thus, ROSCOs and TOCs are locked into a bilateral trading relationship since
each ROSCO does not have a suitable fleet of the required size available for each
TOC and because each TOC requires a different package of vehicles. (see Annex 1)
b) Dedicated assets specificity5
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The second type of specificity is dedicated assets specificity.
The ROSCOs are reluctant to finance rolling stock with a likely operating life of
30 plus years for a TOC owning a franchise of at most 15 years. Indeed, ROSCOs are
not assured that their clients will renew their franchise and that the new operators will
lease the trains for the same price (subsidies will indeed decrease gradually).
Moreover, uncertainties over the next franchise round cause the TOCs to be reluctant
to finance new rolling stock as well. Indeed, they are not sure of their ability to make
their investment profitable.
Consequently, neither ROSCOs nor TOCs have incentive to invest and the
rolling stock is getting old. (see Annex 1)
Transactions between lessors and lessees of rolling stock are thus characterised
by a physical specificity and a dedicated assets specificity which lock partners into a
bilateral dependency relationship.
According to the TCE, such features work against the chosen solution that is to
say vertical disintegration and short term contracts (between 6 and 8 years whereas
rolling stock life duration is 30 years). On the contrary, in such a context, TCT
advocates vertical integration of the supplier by the client. This phenomenon has
already occurred since in June 1996, Stagecoach bus company, which runs the Island
Line and South West Trains franchises, bought the ROSCO Porterbrook Leasing
Company.
                                                                                                                                           
4
 “ When one or both parties to the transaction make investments in equipment and machinery that
involve design characteristics specific to the transaction ”, investments are physically specific. Joskow
[1987]
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Therefore, the boundary set up between rolling stock owners and trains
operators does not seem natural at all because of the high level of assets specificity
involved by their transactions. Theoretically, the existence of a bilateral dependency
relationship between TOCs and ROSCOs is in opposition to the vertical disintegration
solution. That is why modifications of the governance structure are expected. Vertical
re-integration is an option but there are other ways to safeguard rents and attenuate
opportunistic behaviours. Thus, initial leases renegotiation and new leases negotiation
must be considered (section III).
2.3 The separation of rolling stock heavy maintenance and light
maintenance
Theoretically, the TOCs are responsible for procuring running maintenance and
repairs, that is to say light maintenance, and the ROSCOs procure heavy maintenance
and repair. That is why leasing charges paid by the TOCs to the ROSCOs comprise
two elements :
• the capital rent for the lease of the rolling stock,
• the non capital rent, which covers heavy maintenance costs.
However, to procure heavy maintenance, the ROSCOs do not have the required
facilities and have to procure these services from contractors.
The separation of heavy maintenance, rolling stock ownership and light
maintenance has thus introduced additional intermediaries called
ROSCOs’subcontractors. Consequently, the non capital rent of lease payments
                                                                                                                                           
5
 Dedicated assets refer to “ substantial, general-purpose investments that would not have been made
outside a particular transaction, the commitment of which is necessary to serve a large customer.”
(Shelanski-Klein [1995])
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includes contracting costs that can be avoided. Indeed, some TOCs have light
maintenance facilities and can use their depots and staff for heavy maintenance, thus
make significant savings in the provision of non capital items.
For these TOCs, integration of heavy and light maintenance is a way to reduce
the costs.6
Therefore, the separation of heavy maintenance and light maintenance is
inadequate is some cases and reintegration is envisaged.
For the rolling stock related activities, the main boundaries set up by the reform
are artificial and do not coincide with current transactional attributes. The high level
of assets specificity of rolling stock and maintenance facilities has not been taken into
account. Therefore, according to TCT, this absence of proper judgement will lead to
coordination issues, if the hybrid form set up to replace the integrated structure is
inefficient.
                                                
6
 For those who do not have maintenance facilities, open competitive tender from all heavy
maintenance providers reduces the costs of maintenance.
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III. The coordinative power of leasing contracts
The new governance structure of rolling stock related transactions is based on
contracts. Since the separation of the different rolling stock activities induces bilateral
dependency relationships, what is the coordinative power of these contracts ? Can
they solve the issues addressed in section II, that is to say are they incitative enough to
reduce the contractors’opportunistic behaviours ?
To answer these questions and assess the efficiency of the new governance
structure, the leases various provisions are studied.
1. Duration
The rolling stock leasing agreements length varies between 6 and 8 years. This
duration does not match an assets life duration of up to 30 years and a high level of
assets
specificity (Joskow [1987]). That is why lease charges are high.
Indeed, a way to compensate the disadvantage of short term contracts is to set
high revenues, which can be considered price premiums. (Williamson [1985]).
However, in terms of efficiency, this option does not seem to be the more
appropriate to the transactions attributes, and in particular to the high level of assets
specificity. This situation is certainly comfortable for the ROSCOs since their
investments profitability is assured. But, it jeopardises the plans of British railways
modernisation because it does not incite the parties to invest.
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2. Coordination modalities
2.1 Incentives mechanisms and sanction clauses
There is a system of monetary compensations that TOCs must pay in case of
rolling stock damage. Schedule 4 of the leasing agreements also provides for TOCs
compensations by the ROSCOs in case of technical or endemic failures of trains (that
is to say problems due to trains design). The ROSCOs also have to compensate the
TOCs if failures due to an awkward heavy maintenance are observed while ROSCOs
are in charge of this activity.
Also there is in place a system by which constructors compensate ROSCO’s if
train design drawbacks cause recurring problems.
In case of technical failures, both ROSCOs and designers are responsible : the
designers to ROSCOS, and the ROSCOs to TOCs.
Consequently, liabilities are difficult to determine with reasonable certainty and
speed. For example, when a train breaks down, it is difficult to know fast the cause of
this failure : an awkward light maintenance ? (in this case, the TOC is responsible), a
negligence on the light maintenance supplier company’s part ? (which is a TOC or a
ROSCO’s subcontractor), a design drawback (designer and ROSCOs) ? The
investigation period can be long and costly for the TOCs, since “ their ” trains are
immobilised as long as the responsible is not found.
Therefore, it is not the incentive system which is inefficient, it is the governance
structure and the separation between TOCs and ROSCOs which raise an issue. To
disintegrate activities involving highly specific assets and to replace the integrated
structure by short term contracts is the opposite of what TCT advocates. Whatever the
incentive mechanisms are, transactions complexity, linked to assets specificity, makes
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the drafting of complete contracts almost impossible and thus leaves the door open to
opportunistic behaviours of the parties. Each tries to capture as much rent as possible
and biases or hides information. In case of train failures the investigation periods are
then longer and trickier, which induces extra costs and makes the governance
structure inefficient.
2.2 Arbitration procedures and institutional aspects
Several arbitration conflict procedures7 are defined in the contracts but their
effectiveness depends on information availability and thus is subject to agents’
opportunistic behaviours.
2.3 Contracts negotiation
Since ROSCOs are neither obliged nor incited to invest in the contract, TOCs
try to find other coordination mechanisms, in particular the (re)negotiation of
contractual clauses. Thus, negotiation plays an essential role in the coordination
between TOCs and ROSCOs.
2.3.1 Negotiation of changes to existing leases
TOCs experience difficulties in negotiation of changes to existing leases on
such matters as lease charges and vehicles availability. Indeed, prices are imposed and
non renegotiable. Furthermore, because of the tight balance between demand for stock
of desirable types and available supply, the TOCs face a lack of flexibility and
choices.
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However, as regard maintenance, the TOCs have negotiated significant changes
and found alternative arrangements. Indeed, some of them have obtained that
maintenance repairs can be carried out at their own maintenance depots and not at the
ROSCOs depots.
Thus, by negotiating contractual clauses relative to rolling stock heavy
maintenance, the TOCs get to a new governance structure : integration of heavy and
light maintenance.
2.3.2 Negotiation at lease renewal
On the one hand, the expiration of some leasing contracts will give TOCs a
greater power of negotiation. TOCs can threaten ROSCOs not to renew their leasing
agreements. Therefore, lessors are incited to accept new clauses, in favour of the
TOCs.
On the other hand, at the leases renewal, the TOCs will be able to include
clauses relative to investment in rolling stock. They will be able to condition lease
renewal to the financing of new trains by the ROSCOs. Unlike the first rolling stock
leasing agreements, the new contracts will then be incentive.
Nevertheless, to convince the ROSCOs to purchase new trains and to lease at
reasonable prices, the TOCs will have to present low-risk investments plans.
Therefore, the TOCs will have to propose the ROSCOs standard rolling stock ; this
implies indeed that the ROSCOs will have less difficulties to find lessees and will be
able to recover their investments. Moreover, in order to reduce the risk inherent in this
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investment, the TOCs could propose, in return for discounts on leasing prices, long-
term contracts dealing with a greater number of trains.8
To propose standard projects is a way to reduce the rolling stock assets physical
specificity and thus to set up a governance structure with market-type attributes. In
this way, the coordination mechanisms of the contracts could be completed and
replaced by the incentive forces of the market.
The lease incentive mechanisms cannot completely coordinate the contractors
actions, since these contracts are short-term but deal with highly specific assets. That
is why agents attempt to modify both structure and assets.
IV. Remedies
The issues raised by the vertical separation of rolling stock ownership and train
operation are due to the mis-match of the disintegrated contractual structure and the
high level of assets specificity. When the governance structure is not aligned with the
transactions attributes, TCT expects the structure to be altered by agents. Indeed,
transactions characteristics are often considered exogeneous and therefore are not
modified.
However, in our case, agents found two types of remedy : changes in the
governance structure, which is the “ classical ” TCT’s solution, and modification of
assets specificity, which is a much more original solution.
                                                
8
 The negotiation between Connex South Eastern and Forward Trust as regard the financing of new
electrostar trains illustrates this point.
Indeed, Connex has succeeded to convince the ROSCO Forward Trust to invest in these new trains
(class 375 trains) which are of high technology but standard (they can indeed run on all types of tracks,
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1. Parties action upon governance structure
1.1 Integration of ROSCOs by TOCs
As already mentioned, the ROSCO Porterbrook has been purchased by the TOC
Stagecoach. This vertical re-integration process confirms the theory’s predictions : a
high level of asset specificity matches an integrated governance structure.
1.2 Joint financing of new rolling stock
An alternative approach is the joint financing of new rolling stock by rolling
stock manufacturers and franchisees. Thus, ownership of rolling stock and train
operation are not separated any longer since TOCs partly own the trains they operate
and do not have to go through ROSCOs.9
1.3 Integration of the rolling stock heavy maintenance activity
To avoid intermediaries (ROSCOs and maintenance companies), some TOCs
procure trains heavy maintenance by themselves. By integrating the heavy
maintenance activity, TOCs save on the non capital rent and reduce transaction costs.
Two main factors facilitate this re-integration phenomenon : first, the staff TOCs
employ for light maintenance is already skilled to do heavy maintenance tasks. Thus,
the TOCs who decide to integrate the heavy maintenance activity do not have to bear
additional employees training costs. Second, TOCs save on transaction costs. Indeed,
for the ROSCOs, to do maintenance induces additional costs. These are : normal on-
                                                                                                                                           
with catenary or third rail. The operating company has also negotiated more attractive leasing prices in
return for a long-term commitment and for the leasing of several trains units.
9
 For instance, Connex South Eastern is self-financing new rolling stock.
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going maintenance costs and transactional costs involved by agreements with
subcontractors, trains transferring and parking expenditures and the compensations
given to the TOCs for trains unavailability. All extraordinary costs are eliminated by
integration. Accordingly integration is often preferred by TOCs to the initial
governance structure.
Once again, in front of a governance structure unsuitable to their transactions,
agents (TOCs) modify it. Integration tends to be, as for rolling stock heavy
maintenance, the most judicious and the less costly solution.
1.3 Franchise period lengthening
Some franchises, which contain commitments to obtain new or refurbished
rolling
stock, are longer (15 years) than the standard ones. The other agreements provide for
an adaptation of franchise duration to investment constraints. Franchise period
lengthening is indeed a way to get closer to an integrated governance structure, which
is more adapted to the high level of rolling stock assets specificity.
As the TCT advocates, when agents cannot reach the organisational structure
that matches a high level of assets specificity, they chose the hybrid structure of long-
term contracts. (Joskow [1987], Crocker [1988])
2. Parties action upon assets specificity : rolling stock standardisation
The former British Rail policy was to design trains for specific lines (supplied
by third rail or catenary). Furthermore, as a unique client, BR played an essential role
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in the technical definition of rolling stock and let little margin to innovate to
designers.
Nowadays, the relationship between rolling stock buyers and designers are quite
different. On the one hand, the liability of rolling stock technical definition is also
incumbent upon suppliers (and not only upon clients). On the other hand, designers,
ROSCOs and TOCs attempt to standardise rolling stock.10
The rolling stock standardisation tends to improve the governance structure
efficiency. Indeed, by designing standard trains that are adapted to the whole network,
manufacturers modify the existing bilateral dependency between TOCs and ROSCOs.
The significant investments made by designers and ROSCOs are more easily
redeployable when they apply to standard vehicles, capable of use on a number of
different lines. Furthermore, TOCs can protect themselves against the risk of
opportunistic behaviour and rent appropriation by their partners because the supplier
switching costs are lower in such cases (low asset specificity).
By reducing trains physical specificity, operators contribute to the setting up of
a market structure, in accordance with the reforms objectives and the theoretical
hypothesis. (TCT indeed draws a direct link between de-integration and loss of asset
specificity.)
However, if standardisation reduces the dependency between clients and
suppliers, concentration of the designers market ultimately will reinforce it.
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 Thus, the new flexible trains designed by Adtranz will be able to run on all the lines. Moreover, this
designer intends to develop modulary trains with characteristics standard enough to satisfy the
maximum clients. Adtranz is not the only company to bet on standardisation since GEC-Alsthom,
another important designer, has just launched a new concept of standard train (“ Juniper ”).
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Furthermore, because of the low standardisation of rail at the international level
(each country has its own particularities as regard electricity supplying system,
signalling, track gauges), the appeal to foreign suppliers is limited.
At last, rolling stock standardisation is a long-range process which depends on
the specific rolling stock life duration and on the infrastructure modernisation
programs.
Thus, rolling stock standardisation partly solves the governance structure
inefficiency problem.
V. Conclusion
The new British rail structure is already being transformed, in particular as
regard rolling stock related activities. Indeed, to attenuate the opportunistic
behaviours (rent appropriation, underinvestment) that the rolling stock assets
specificity induces, agents are altering the contractual disintegrated structure and
changing the level of assets specificity, as TCT advocates.
However, in the new rail system, train operators are subject to regulatory
constraints as regard the passenger services they must procure, whereas rolling stock
owners are not. Consequently, TOCs are more incited to implement changes than
ROSCOs, whose revenue is secure, at least in the mid-range. That is why the British
Department of Transport is envisaging a possible re-regulation of trains owners.
21
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Annex 1 : The fleet of the 3 initial ROSCOs
Angel Forward Trust Porterbrook Total
Electric units 2099 2684 1615 6398
Diesel units 1094 0 681 2155
High speed
trains
539 0 370 1775
Locomotives 0 1366 789 909
Total number
of vehicles
3732 4050 3455 11237
Total number
of clients
19 16 16
Average age 16 17.6 16
 (Sources : Review of the Rolling Stock Market, ORR, May 1998
Department of Transport release, November 1995.)
Annex 1 : Rolling stock orders
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Rolling stock orders
(Source : RIA Designers)
The recovery in 1997 is due to the enforcement of new measures concerning the
replacement of old slam doors trains. Despite this recovery, the level of orders will not
be sufficient to maintain the trains fleet in a good state.
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Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics
The Research Programme
The DRUID-research programme is organised in 3 different research themes:
- The firm as a learning organisation
- Competence building and inter-firm dynamics
- The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation
In each of the three areas there is one strategic theoretical and one central empirical and
policy oriented orientation.
Theme A: The firm as a learning organisation  
The theoretical perspective confronts and combines the resource-based view (Penrose,
1959) with recent approaches where the focus is on learning and the dynamic
capabilities of the firm (Dosi, Teece and Winter, 1992). The aim of this theoretical work
is to develop an analytical understanding of the firm as a learning organisation.
The empirical and policy issues relate to the nexus technology, productivity,
organisational change and human resources. More insight in the dynamic interplay
between these factors at the level of the firm is crucial to understand international
differences in performance at the macro level in terms of economic growth and
employment.
Theme B: Competence building and inter-firm dynamics
The theoretical perspective relates to the dynamics of the inter-firm division of labour
and the formation of network relationships between firms. An attempt will be made to
develop evolutionary models with Schumpeterian innovations as the motor driving a
Marshallian evolution of the division of labour.
The empirical and policy issues relate the formation of knowledge-intensive regional
and sectoral networks of firms to competitiveness and structural change. Data on the
structure of production will be combined with indicators of knowledge and learning.
IO-matrixes which include flows of knowledge and new technologies will be developed
and supplemented by data from case-studies and questionnaires.
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Theme C: The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation.
The third theme aims at a stronger conceptual and theoretical base for new concepts
such as 'systems of innovation' and 'the learning economy' and to link these concepts to
the ecological dimension. The focus is on the interaction between institutional and
technical change in a specified geographical space. An attempt will be made to
synthesise theories of economic development emphasising the role of science based-
sectors with those emphasising learning-by-producing and the growing knowledge-
intensity of all economic activities.
The main empirical and policy issues are related to changes in the local dimensions of
innovation and learning. What remains of the relative autonomy of national systems of
innovation? Is there a tendency towards convergence or divergence in the specialisation
in trade, production, innovation and in the knowledge base itself when we compare
regions and nations?
The Ph.D.-programme
There are at present more than 10 Ph.D.-students working in close connection to the
DRUID research programme. DRUID organises regularly specific Ph.D-activities such
as workshops, seminars and courses, often in a co-operation with other Danish or
international institutes. Also important is the role of DRUID as an environment which
stimulates the Ph.D.-students to become creative and effective. This involves several
elements:
- access to the international network in the form of visiting fellows and visits at the
sister institutions
- participation in research projects
- access to supervision of theses
- access to databases
Each year DRUID welcomes a limited number of foreign Ph.D.-students who wants to
work on subjects and project close to the core of the DRUID-research programme.
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External projects
DRUID-members are involved in projects with external support. One major project
which covers several of the elements of the research programme is DISKO; a
comparative analysis of the Danish Innovation System; and there are several projects
involving international co-operation within EU's 4th Framework Programme. DRUID is
open to host other projects as far as they fall within its research profile. Special
attention is given to the communication of research results from such projects to a wide
set of social actors and policy makers.
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